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Abstract and Keywords 
Investment treaty arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rules-based system and thus as something that 
advances the rule of law. But there is a tendency to downplay the system's inattention to well-known 
safeguards of judicial independence and, in turn, to the procedural core of the rule of law concept. This 
chapter argues that investment treaty arbitration falls short in institutional terms due to its unique 
combination of arbitration and public law, its asymmetrical claims structure, its reliance on executive 
officials to make case-by-case appointments, and its attenuation of judicial oversight. These 
characteristics create an apprehension of bias in favour of claimants (investors) and in favour of those 
states that wield power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole. This, in turn, undermines 
claims that the system advances the rule of law. 
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I. Introduction 
Investment treaty arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rules-based system and, in this respect, as 
something that advances the rule of law.1 This claim is undermined, however, by procedural and 
institutional aspects of the system that suggest it will tend to favour claimants and, more specifically, 
those states and other actors that wield power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole. On 
the other hand, other states and investors (especially those that bring claims against a powerful state) can 
expect to be disadvantaged. (p.628) 
To the degree that such perceptions of bias have currency, as is argued here, this arises primarily from the 
use of arbitration to decide finally questions of public law.2 First, the novel situation in which claims can 
be brought by only one class of parties, and only the other class can be found to have violated the treaty, 
provides investment treaty arbitrators (including those who are state-appointed) with an incentive to 
favour claimants in order to advance the interests of the industry and their position within it. Secondly, 
the fact that arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis raises the concern that they will seek to 
please those who hold power in the key appointing authorities and in the arbitration industry. In both 
respects, the absence of institutional safeguards of impartiality and independence—especially those of 
security of tenure, prohibitions on outside remuneration, and an objective method of case-by-case 
assignment—undermines the normative basis for the adjudicative system's displacement of other modes 
of decision-making. 
Those who promote investment treaty arbitration usually do so in conjunction with a robust criticism of 
both domestic courts (as apparently or actually biased against foreign investors) and international 
diplomacy (as ‘political’ rather than governed by law).3 Investment treaty arbitration is said to address the 
limitations of these other forms of decision-making by laying out predictable rules to govern relations 
between investors and states and by allowing investors to bring claims against states for resolution by a 
fair process. An initial difficulty with this position, not addressed here but worth reflecting upon, is that 
investment treaties generally do not establish coherent, non-contradictory rules that are capable of being 
known and thus followed on a reasonably reliable basis, but rather a set of broadly-framed ideals that 
have in turn been assigned different and at times conflicting4 meanings when interpreted by arbitrators. It 
is an open question whether a lack of clarity or coherence in the standards that regulate states and that 
implicate investors can be said to undermine the objective of a rules-based system;5 one's answer may 
depend for instance on whether one regards (p.629) standards or rules as more effective at offering 
guidance in the circumstances6 and whether one concludes that states should in the present context enjoy 
the benefits of clarity or predictability as elements of the rule of law. A more immediate concern, though, 
arises from another aspect of the association of investment treaty arbitration with the rule of law. The 
problem is that the system appears not to deliver on a core component of fair process, especially the 
demands of independence (and impartiality)7 in the final judgment of public law. 
Adjudication is often said to advance the rule of law. Needless to say, the rule of law is a concept that is 
given different meanings, sometimes divergent. However, the concept is widely regarded to include at the 
procedural level the requirement for a fair decision-making process in circumstances where a government 
decision affects significantly an individual or specific group, based on the provision of adequate notice and 
an opportunity to reply, and of a decision by an independent and impartial decision-maker. Just how the 
rule of law should apply to the benefit of states, as opposed to individuals, where they are subject to 
review at the international level, is a challenging question8 and it may be that the implementation of 
relevant principles should vary where a decision affects people or groups not directly but rather through 
the vehicle of their state.9 Yet where it is claimed that the shift to adjudication advances the rule of law, it 
is also pertinent to ask whether and how procedural components of that concept are reflected in the 
particular form of adjudication that is on offer. In this chapter, the argument is that investment treaty 
arbitration falls short in institutional terms due to its unique combination of arbitration and public law, 
its asymmetrical10 claims structure, its (p.630) reliance on executive officials to make case-by-case 
appointments, and its attenuation of judicial oversight. The focus as such is not on actual bias in 
investment treaty arbitration but, more appropriately, on institutional and procedural aspects of the 
system that raise suspicions of bias. 
II. Context 
A. The Uniqueness of Investment Treaty Arbitration 
To elaborate on the procedural concerns in investment treaty arbitration it is necessary to outline how the 
system intertwines public law and international adjudication in order to subject questions of sovereign 
authority and public budgeting—also referred to here as matters of public law and policy—to international 
review. What is unique about investment treaty arbitration is the way in which it engages issues of public 
law, relative to other forms of international adjudication. The system is international and subject to public 
international law because it is established by treaties between states. Unlike domestic public law, 
therefore, it is established by agreements between public entities that do not interact with each other 
within a hierarchical system of sovereign authority and that are not subject to a classical separation of 
powers.11 Investment treaties are typically concluded by executive officials of states who present an agreed 
treaty text for adoption by their respective legislatures or other domestic authorities, often without 
extensive legislative deliberation and debate.12Likewise, the operation of the system relies extensively on 
processes of international adjudication to interpret and apply the treaties in specific cases and thus to 
determine the appropriate meaning to be given to silence or ambiguity. The law-making function of the 
relevant sovereigns13 is exercised primarily by the executive officers who draft the treaties and secondarily 
by the arbitrators who interpret and apply them. Domestic legislatures are minor players, relative to the 
domestic context where public law is elaborated in the national constitution and in detailed statutes and 
subsidiary instruments, where the key role of the courts (outside constitutional law) is to formulate an 
understanding of (p.631) legislative intent and interpret the law accordingly, and where the legislature 
has the opportunity to override or ‘dialogue’ with the courts as it sees fit.14 
Nevertheless, investment treaty arbitration resembles judicial review in domestic public law to a greater 
extent than do other modern forms of international adjudication. In this respect, it differs from others 
contexts in which international arbitration is used. Both international commercial arbitration and inter-
state adjudication, for instance, are used typically to resolve disputes arising from reciprocal relationships 
between the disputing parties (whether between private parties—including, potentially, the state acting in 
a private capacity—or between sovereigns). Reflecting this formal reciprocity, either disputing party is 
capable of bringing a claim against the other and of possessing the same legal rights and obligations. In 
investment treaty arbitration, on the other hand, the disputes arise between a private party and a state in 
relation to the latter's assumption and assertion of sovereign authority. Thus, the disputes arise in the 
context of a regulatory rather than a reciprocal relationship, turning as such on the idea that states may 
exercise authority and hold responsibilities that no private party can possess. 
Investment treaty arbitration also differs from other treaty-based adjudicative regimes, including other 
international courts and tribunals, by its combination of five characteristics. First, individuals can bring 
international claims directly against the state in the context of the regulatory rather than a commercial 
relationship. Secondly, the state's consent to arbitration is generalized and prospective, extending in effect 
to any individual or organization that qualifies as an investor under the treaty; it is not limited to disputes 
arising from a specific relationship or historical event. Thirdly, the primary remedy is a damages award 
against the state; this is important because, in public law, state liability is usually circumscribed in the 
light of its implications for government planning and budgeting. Fourthly, unlike other treaties that allow 
individual claims, investment treaties remove the investor's duty to exhaust local remedies, thus causing 
the system to eclipse the customary role of domestic legal systems, especially domestic courts, in 
mediating between the international sphere and domestic regulatory relationships. Fifthly, unlike other 
decisions or awards in public law, investment treaty awards are widely enforceable in many countries with 
limited opportunity for judicial review. As a result, the arbitrators are authorized to resolve core questions 
of public law without the prospect of review by an independent court, whether domestic or 
international.(p.632) 
Considering these features, it is apparent just how far the system has moved from the realm of inter-state 
adjudication to one in which an international adjudicator can review intensively governmental choices of 
states.15 The system delegates to arbitrators the power to define what activities are sovereign and what are 
not, to decide whether sovereign actors have acted improperly and unlawfully, and to direct the payment 
of public money or the seizure of public assets on behalf of private actors. The system subjects states to 
intensive review by tribunals that are established (usually) in a foreign jurisdiction and backed by the 
coercive power of other states over foreign-owned assets within their own territory. For these reasons, 
investment treaty arbitration is probably the closest the world has come to an international adjudicative 
body with compulsory jurisdiction over claims by individuals against states in the regulatory sphere. That 
is, it is the closest we have come to an international constitutional or administrative court if we 
understand such a body to be one that would allow individuals directly to initiate adjudicative review of 
the state's sovereign activity and to obtain a binding determination of the legality of state conduct as well 
as a precise and powerful remedy.16 Yet ironically the claims are not resolved by a court at all. They are 
resolved instead by a system of adjudication that originated in dispute resolution between private parties 
and between public entities, and that evolved to endorse and satisfy the demands of party autonomy 
before those of open and independent judging in the liberal democratic tradition. 
B. A Caution on Domestic Analogies 
The uniqueness of investment treaty arbitration makes it useful but also questionable to examine 
analogies in domestic law so as to illuminate the system and its intended meaning.17The challenge goes 
beyond the usual hazards of legal transplantation, such as the difficulty of reducing different rules and 
processes to particular forms despite their varying contexts and histories, the risk of losing sight of the 
details while searching for a general unifying position, or the possibility that an outsider may discover and 
borrow only what he or she prefers to find in a particular jurisdiction. These pitfalls are always important 
to keep in mind.18 They highlight the importance of examining sources in public international law—above 
all where they engage the regulatory relationship in ways comparable to investment treaty arbitration—
with at least as much priority as domestic sources. Likewise, there are limitations to the utility of domestic 
law and domestic legal systems as a source of guidance to interpret investment treaties. For example, if 
one were to look to these sources for an indication of how to interpret a particular (p.633) treaty, one 
should presumably begin (and arguably end) with the domestic law of the relevant state parties.19 
Beyond the question of appropriate sources, there is a further challenge in an attempt to use domestic 
analogues to inform adjudicative decision-making on the international plane (and perhaps vice versa). An 
adjudicator who exercises authority over the public law and policy of a state, pursuant to a broadly-
framed treaty, must recognize that his or her own sovereign decision-making role is in key respects more 
determinative than that of a domestic judge. The international adjudicator must often decide the terms of 
an inter-state agreement in the absence of a mature jurisprudence (whether coming to maturity before or 
after states have concluded the treaty) and in the absence of a reasonable prospect of review and 
amendment of the treaty by the state parties. But, faced with individual claims in the absence of a duty to 
exhaust local remedies, the adjudicator will review sovereign choices in much the same manner that a 
domestic court reviews legislative, judicial, or executive decisions. Thus, as in domestic judicial review, it 
may be necessary for the adjudicator to distinguish between different decision-makers and the level of 
generality of the measures they have established in order to determine, among other things, the 
appropriateness of deference.20 
The present study seeks to examine investment treaty arbitration from a perspective of public law that is 
informed by experiences in both domestic and international law. It does not look in detail at the laws of a 
specific domestic jurisdiction, however, nor does it seek to clarify treaty language or develop general 
principles of law to inform the interpretive process in investment arbitration. Rather, the aim here is to 
highlight certain principles or ‘grounding values’21 of public law—arising from procedural and 
institutional components of the rule of law—and to examine investment treaty arbitration in the light of 
these principles.22 The implication is not that international adjudication should precisely replicate 
features of domestic law23 but rather that a focus on procedural and institutional concerns may offer a 
more focused framework for using the rule of law as an evaluative concept in the international 
sphere.24 (p.634) 
III. The Issue of the Rule of Law 
A. The Emphasis on Procedural Fairness 
Those who invoke the rule of law often do so in order to defend one or another form of adjudication as a 
preferred method of decision-making.25 This implies that the relevant form of adjudication is itself 
consistent with and measurable against criteria associated with the rule of law.26 Speaking generally, the 
rule of law is important because of the values it conveys and because it calls on those involved in decision-
making to take values seriously.27 But it is a malleable concept that is easily employed as a political slogan, 
marketing device, or simple ‘Hurrah!’28 It is therefore prudent to consider the purposes of one who 
invokes the rule of law and the particular glean that has been given to the term. Like freedom or equality 
or democracy, the rule of law can mean essentially29 different things to different people, and may be used 
for obfuscation and manipulation as well as for clarification or guidance.30 
In this chapter, the focus is on procedural and institutional rather than substantive elements of the rule of 
law. The focus is also on the fairness of adjudication rather than law-making generally.31 This focus has 
been arrived at in an effort to limit engagement with wider debates about investment treaty arbitration in 
which the rule of law is given a prescriptive meaning and used as platform for substantive comment on 
investor-state relations. These substantive invocations of the rule of law have different iterations but in 
the present context they typically advocate a limited role for the state, based on an espoused preference 
for fairness, individual freedom, and market efficiency. With this usually comes a strong dose of 
scepticism about the motivations and capacity of government to promote social welfare. In terms of 
international review, the state's role in modern society is typically not said to warrant deference from 
international adjudicators on the grounds that domestic governments are better able to make regulatory 
choices or that they have a stronger claim to legitimacy. Indeed, states are at times framed as hostile and 
illegitimate, and their review by arbitrators as aimed at ameliorating these failings (p.635) and 
advancing business freedom as a higher goal: ‘the role of investment treaties is to provide an external 
anchor for economic policies that are in the long-term sensible for national economies and the global 
economy’, as Thomas Wälde put it.32 By this version of the rule of law, then, it is investment arbitrators 
who are to decide whether a state's decisions are ‘sensible’ and to award compensation to business where 
the state has been found to have encroached on some substantive priority. 
As an aside, one criticism of this type of rule of law advocacy for the system is that it constructs an 
artificial contest between ‘misplaced dichotomies’ or caricatures and, as such, may miss a good part of 
current debates about the appropriate role of governments and markets.33 Its invocation of the rule of law 
evokes Friedrich Krachtowil's ‘frightening prospect of a rule of lawyers who function as “experts” by 
emasculating politics’.34 Positioned in contrast to approaches to investment rules that aim ‘to freeze 
politics and inhibit the imagination of alternative futures’, David Schneiderman refers to (and criticizes) 
Franz Neumann's ‘social rule of law’ whose function was ‘to uncover and rectify socioeconomic relations 
of domination and subordination’.35 For present purposes, what this highlights is simply a selectivity on 
the part of many rule-of-law proponents of investment treaty arbitration. It is dubious to claim that the 
rule of law is clearly aligned with any one set of answers to core substantive questions—whether 
governments should pursue certain outcomes; whether individual rights or interests should take 
precedence over community concerns; how ideals like democracy, justice, and efficiency should be 
balanced; whether the mediation of conflicting rights and interests is best resolved through adjudication—
because these are among the most contested elements of the rule of the law,36 leading to myriad thick 
notions of the concept.37 There is simply no accepted understanding of what the rule of law means 
substantively in terms of the role of the state in modern society (or even whether and to what extent the 
concept extends to notions of substantive justice38 (p.636) or whether it refers to a process of reasoning 
about the normative basis for law).39 It is thus questionable to invoke the concept in a substantively 
prescriptive way without acknowledging the underlying debates. 
Partly in an effort to sidestep much of the debate about the substantive choices of states in their regulatory 
relations with investors, this chapter focuses on procedural aspects of the rule of law. The aim, informed 
by Judith Shklar's lively sojourn through theoretical work on the rule of law (contrasting especially the 
work of Friedrich Hayek and Roberto Unger), is to avoid treating the concept ‘as a football in a game 
between friends and enemies of free-market liberalism’.40 Jeremy Waldron has observed that the 
procedural content of the rule of law is less widely debated in academic circles than are substantive 
notions, and yet it is more widely discussed in public discourse.41 Perhaps this indicates a greater level of 
agreement on what the rule of law should mean procedurally, even if procedural fairness is itself a flexible 
concept (and even if the degree of fairness that a decision-making process demands may vary according to 
the significance of the decision for those affected, the purpose of the regulatory scheme, and the role of 
the decision-maker within it, the historical practices of the relevant body and jurisdiction, and so on). No 
doubt, the requirements of independence must also accommodate a range of institutional and regulatory 
settings for decision-making.42Even so, in the light of the common tendency to associate investment treaty 
arbitration with the rule of law, it is pertinent to examine the system itself in terms of the procedural 
elements of the concept. 
It could be that expectations of procedural fairness should be tempered where it is a state rather than an 
individual that is said to have been disadvantaged by apparent bias in international adjudication 
(although, to be clear, my own argument here is that both some investors and some states are 
disadvantaged by unfairness in investment treaty arbitration, while others benefit). The impetus for 
demands of fair process emerge historically from manifold encroachments of state power on individuals, 
encroachments that demand that decision-makers be bound by law and, alongside this, that courts be 
insulated from improper influence.43 The rule of law concept evolved as a framework for protecting 
individuals from the (p.637) state, and foreign investors (and other foreign nationals) are of course 
vulnerable to state abuse. In the light of this, there are important questions about the place of the rule of 
law in the international sphere.44 With respect to investment treaty arbitration, for example, various 
questions arise when one seeks to apply a general concept rooted in the relationship between states and 
individuals to the international review of state regulation of private actors, given that neither the analogy 
of individual-to-state nor that of individual-to-firm necessarily holds.45 
Yet there are also compelling reasons to expect a high level of independence, and probably other elements 
of procedural fairness,46 in investment treaty arbitration. This expectation serves to protect investors and 
states, but also to support the confidence of the public and of those not represented directly in the 
adjudicative process but nevertheless affected by it. For one, the use of adjudication to make decisions 
almost always carries a very high expectation of procedural fairness, including in international 
arbitration.47 Moreover, the process here is not simply adjudicative but also both compulsory and 
exceptionally final in its resolution of public law and its decision-making about state liability. There is 
limited judicial oversight by domestic courts (and none by any international court) and so little 
opportunity for the system to piggyback on the institutional independence of established judiciaries 
through an appellate process. Also, investment treaty arbitration involves not only the review of decisions 
that affect the claimant in a specific and discrete way. It extends to polycentric legislative, judicial, and 
executive decisions and often engages matters of general significance. The redirection of public funds to 
private actors impacts on those who would benefit from government programmes that are no longer 
affordable and on those (p.638) who would benefit from regulatory activity that has been disrupted or 
deterred.48 As recognized in domestic law, state liability raises significant concerns about regulatory 
deterrence,49 even if the fiscal and regulatory impacts of investment arbitration are difficult to isolate and 
measure.50 These aspects of the system—its form, its determinativeness, its purpose, and its outcomes—
indicate a need for robust assurances of independence. One could defend an arrangement that lacked such 
assurances on other grounds, by characterizing it, for instance, as a realist bargain, fair or unfair, between 
states,51 or by conceding simply that in the present context ‘domination [is] shedding its legitimating 
rationalizations’.52 However, if one asserts that investment treaty arbitration offers a fair, rules-based, and 
thus superior method of decision-making, then the system is appropriately held to a high standard of 
independence. 
This focus on process does not mean that the rule of law should be stripped of all substantive meaning. 
There are areas in which the line between process and substance is difficult to draw.53 It is often said that 
the rule of law precludes a legislature from enacting laws that delegate authority or regulate conduct using 
vague language because this gives executive officials too much discretion over how their authority should 
be exercised and does not provide sufficient guidance to regulated actors.54 The rule of law is also widely 
understood to include substantive notions of fairness, of which courts are the guardians, even if questions 
of content remain highly contested. Courts are also usually expected to ensure that statutory decision-
makers respect the boundaries of the delegation of their authority and that individuals are protected from 
arbitrary treatment by public officials.55 These elements reflect a thin version of the rule of law, one that 
‘upholds and supports diversity in moral and political ends’,56 but with a substan (p.639) tive quality 
nonetheless.57 Further, courts have at times asserted their authority to protect individuals from egregious 
treatment by the state—detention in degrading conditions, for example—on the basis that it violates 
fundamental values, even in the face of the clear will of the legislature.58 Yet, when reviewing substantive 
decisions by other state actors, courts also usually take care to avoid intervening in matters that are 
appropriately left to decision-makers which are more representative, more expert, or otherwise more able 
than the courts.59 
B. The Role of Judicial Independence 
A discussion of the relationship between the rule of law and fairness may refer to law-making itself, to 
decision-making, or to the separation of judicial from other state functions. Fuller's approach to the rule 
of law, for example, identified characteristics that constitute laws as general rules and that allow those 
who are subject to the law to follow it. Laws that met certain criteria60 were said by Fuller to be consistent 
with the rule of law in a formal sense although the law might be put to a range of purposes and lead to 
varying outcomes. According to Lacey:61 
Fuller's was not a dogmatic, substantive natural law position: rather, it was a position which built out 
from certain valued procedural tenets widely associated with the rule of law…It was this universal ‘inner 
morality of law’ which provided the necessary connection between law and morality, and not the ‘external’ 
or substantive morality which infused the content of law in different ways in different systems. 
Fuller's template applies to law-making but is also relevant to decision-making in specific cases or 
disputes. Any examination of the fairness of a process of decision-making must account for the role and 
character of that process and its implications for those who are affected by it. Based on ancient sources, 
procedural fairness in decision-making entails two key principles. First is that of audi alterem partem, 
‘hear the other side’, referring to the need to provide notice and an opportunity to reply.62 Second is the 
principle of nemo judex sua causa, ‘no one shall judge (p.640) his own cause’, referring to the 
requirement for an unbiased decision-maker.63 Thus, if the rule of law is invoked to refer to fairness in 
decision-making, then the independence of the decision-maker is an integral consideration, even if the 
ways in which independence is advanced may vary. 
Whether one focuses on the rule of law in law-making or in adjudication, independent courts are typically 
given a central role. In his definition of the rule of law, Albert Venn Dicey emphasized the importance of 
the ‘ordinary courts’, by which he meant (rather parochially) the superior courts of England and Wales, 
whose independence was advanced, among other things, by objective safeguards to protect against 
outside interference. Joseph Raz noted on judicial independence and the rule of law that ‘the court's 
judgment establishes conclusively what is the law in the case before it’ and that, without an independent 
adjudicator, ‘people will only be able to be guided by their guesses as to what the courts are likely to do, 
but these guesses will not be based on the law but on other considerations’.64 Along the same lines, 
consider the following comment by Hayek on law-making and the courts:65 
In theory, at least, it is still unquestioned doctrine that the law ought to be general, equal, and certain, and 
that it ought to be administered by independent judges. This involves not only…some degree of separation 
of powers and the recognition of the principle of nulla poena sine lege, but also quite generally that 
government can not coerce the private citizen in the service of the momentary goals of its policy, but only 
where it is required by the general rules of law. Indeed…the independent judge is not supposed to be 
concerned with the particular ends the government is pursuing or even to know about them. 
These references convey that a commitment to the rule of law in law-making generally, as well as in the 
specific instance of adjudicative decision-making, is tied to the independence of the courts.66 On the other 
hand, where the rules in a supposedly rules-based system are subject to an adjudicative process that lacks 
independence, it is difficult to describe the system as supportive of the rule of law. Likewise, the role of 
independent courts is a fundamental, or at least widely assumed, component of procedural fairness.67 
In domestic law, the adjudicative authority to review the state's sovereign decisions, even in its role as 
ultimate legislator, is assigned to courts so as to insulate that review function from other 
powers.68 According to Peter Russell: ‘the case for subjecting government itself…to legal limits on its 
authority’ is based on the (p.641) liberal rule of law premise that ‘disputes about whether the non-
judicial branches of government have exercised their powers in a manner authorized by law must be 
decided by judges those branches do not control’.69 To further this separation, and to ensure public 
confidence, objective safeguards of independence were extended historically to the judicial office. These 
include the safeguards of appointment of the judge for a set tenure; prohibitions on removal from office 
other than for cause; guarantees of the judicial salary;70 and assurances of administrative independence, 
including control by a court of its docket, assignment of judges to specific cases, and so on.71 The presence 
of these safeguards establishes an institutional foundation for the special capacity and legitimacy of 
judges both to resolve disputes between parties and to review other public decisions. Courts are usually 
not accountable to a general electorate or staffed by experts in specific fields of regulation. Their 
conventional strength, creating their ‘special competence to interpret public values embodied in 
authoritative texts’,72 lies in a process that allows for the presentation of evidence and argument by those 
affected by a decision, that leads to the carefully reasoned evaluation of claims, and that is based on both a 
detachment from the specific dispute and an institutional separation from other actors. 
The importance of judicial independence is recognized in the many international courts and tribunals that 
exist beyond investor-state arbitration, including those with jurisdiction and effective power over disputes 
that arise from regulatory relations between states and individuals. This is the case, in particular, at the 
European Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Justice, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, and the International Criminal Court, at which judges are appointed for terms of six to nine years, 
are subject to restrictions on outside activities that would be incompatible with judicial independence and 
impartiality as determined by the respective court, and are assigned to specific cases by objective methods 
such as seniority or rotation.73 The common element with domestic courts is that the final word on the 
resolution of specific claims, and the corresponding determination of public law, lies with a decision-
maker (p.642) which enjoys a range of safeguards for its institutional independence and thus an 
objectively verifiable capacity for fair decision-making. 
The longstanding importance of judicial independence is demonstrated by the (here common law) origins 
of judicial security of tenure. In England, security of tenure is understood to have originated in the Act of 
Settlement of 1701 which provided (as of 1714) that judges could no longer be removed at the pleasure of 
the King, but only on approval of both Houses of Parliament.74 This was a covenant of the Glorious 
Revolution and it was achieved only after hard experience in which, for example, Sir Edward Coke—then 
Lord Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas—stood up to James I by refusing to submit the courts to 
an over-ride by the King and was dismissed from office for doing so.75 This basis for preserving judicial 
independence was extended in 1760, when existing judicial appointments were allowed to continue 
beyond the death of the ruling King or Queen. Provisions for security of tenure were later incorporated 
into the US constitution76 and into the constitutions of many other countries77 as a basis for the separation 
of the judicial power.78 In The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton wrote of the ‘permanent tenure of 
judicial officers’ that ‘nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges 
which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty’.79 Security of tenure and a 
guaranteed judicial salary have been described as ‘cardinal centricities of judicial independence’80 and as 
‘an original principle in the basic customary law of the constitution’, whether expressed in an ordinary 
statute or explicitly in the constitution.81 
Despite its origins in the formal separation of powers, security of tenure also insulates judges from 
inappropriate influence by other powerful actors, such as the church, officials of other states or 
international organizations, and private interests.82 With respect to private interests, the influence of 
transnational firms—the most prominent and powerful foreign investors in the present system—has 
become more relevant as globalization has accelerated and its impacts (p.643) have deepened. These 
actors have the potential not only to ‘shape global regulatory regimes’83 but also to influence courts 
directly in the judicial review of state decision-making.84 On this, Shimon Shetreet wrote in 1976:85 
Independence of the judiciary has normally been thought of as freedom from interference by the executive 
or legislature in the exercise of the judicial function…In modern times, with the steady growth of 
corporate giants, it is of utmost importance that the independence of the judiciary from business or 
corporate interests should also be secured. In short, independence of the judiciary implies not only that a 
judge be free from governmental and political pressure and political entanglement but also that he should 
be removed from financial and business entanglements likely to affect, or rather to seem to affect him in 
the exercise of his judicial function. 
IV. Concerns about Independence in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
The absence of security of tenure and other safeguards in investment treaty arbitration, due to its 
uniqueness as a form of public law arbitration, is important because it raises a serious concern about bias 
in the system. In particular, it founds an apprehension of bias in favour of claimants (especially where 
they are likely repeat players or otherwise heavy consumers of legal and arbitration services) and, more 
specifically, in favour of those states that wield major power over appointing authorities or the system as a 
whole. In turn, respondent states in general, as well as those investors who bring claims against such 
powerful states, are likely to be disadvantaged unfairly. This is so for two main reasons. First, based on 
their governance structure and distribution of voting power, many of the entities that exercise appointing 
authority under the treaties appear very likely to favour the priorities of major capital-exporting states or 
foreign investors, or both. Secondly, where only one class of parties brings the claims (in this case 
investors), arbitrators appointed on a case-by-case basis may be suspected of favouring that class of 
parties in order to promote the system and their position within it. Both issues arise from the fact that the 
arbitrators are appointed on a case-by-case basis and that they typically derive extensive business income 
from professional services supplied to powerful actors outside the adjudicative function. 
A. The Inappropriate Influence of Appointing Authorities 
Because investment treaty arbitrators are appointed case-by-case, obvious questions arise about the role 
of appointing authorities under investment treaties. The appointing authorities exercise various 
discretionary powers, including the (p.644) power to appoint the presiding arbitrator where the 
disputing parties (or party-appointed arbitrators) do not agree on who to appoint, the power to appoint a 
party-appointed arbitrator where the relevant party does not do so, the power to decide challenges 
alleging a conflict of interest on the part of an arbitrator (or to determine who should resolve such 
challenges), and—pursuant to the ICSID Convention—the power to appoint all three members of an 
annulment tribunal.86 
Where an adjudicator lacks secure tenure, the appointing authority obviously has much greater influence 
over how the adjudicative process will unfold, case to case, than where the appointment is made once and 
for a lengthy period. In the latter circumstance, an appointing authority will no doubt consider how a 
judicial appointment is likely to alter the ideological inclinations of the bench over a judge's term of office, 
for example.87 But the authority is in a position to act on these preferences only at the time of 
appointment; it cannot adjust its decision on an ongoing basis as it learns of specific claims, the identity of 
the claimant or respondent, the issues raised, the implications of a potential decision, the impact on the 
appointing authority and its associates, and so on. With case-by-case appointments, an appointing 
authority is in a position to do all of these things. This is not to say that the resulting decision will 
necessarily have been based on improper considerations. But it may have been, and clearly the authority 
is in a far stronger position to manage the allocation of adjudicative power within the system—so as to 
accentuate disciplines on some states and alleviate them for others, for instance—than if objective 
safeguards of independence were present. The fact that this is possible in itself founds a credible suspicion 
of bias. Simply put, case-by-case appointment may be seen to operate in favour of those who wield power 
in the appointing authority at the expense of those who do not. 
To whom are these powers allocated under investment treaties? One would expect that in an impartial 
and independent system these powers would be assigned to an entity that was reasonably free of apparent 
bias in favour of investor or state interests (or particular investor or state interests). This is arguably so 
under the few investment treaties88 that allocate appointing authority to judges of the 
International (p.645) Court of Justice.89 However, under the great majority of investment treaties, the 
designated appointing authority leans heavily towards the priorities of the major Western capital-
exporting states or international business. 
Often the authority lies with the World Bank's International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), at which the relevant powers are held by the Chair of the ICSID Administrative Council90 or by 
the ICSID Secretary General.91 Both are executive officials in an international organization. The former is 
an ex officio position of the World Bank President who is by convention a US national,92 nominated by the 
US government and confirmed by the Bank's Board of Directors at which roughly 60 per cent of the voting 
power is held by Executive Directors of eleven major capital-exporting states.93 The ICSID Secretary 
General, conventionally the World Bank's Legal Vice President and General Counsel, although now a 
separate officer,94 is a person nominated by the World Bank President and approved by a two-thirds vote 
of the Administrative Council where states vote on the basis of one vote per member.95 Thus, appointing 
authority at ICSID is vested in (1) an official who is customarily chosen by the US Administration with the 
concurrence of other major capital-exporting states or (2) a person nominated by the official referred to in 
(1) with the concurrence of the state parties to the ICSID Convention.96 The difficulty with this is that, 
given its nomination arrangements, its weighted voting, and its governance structure, (p.646) it is 
difficult for an informed outsider to conclude with confidence that ICSID will be free of improper bias in 
favour of certain states or of the private interests that those states favour.97 
These concerns would remain, but would be less acute, if ICSID were to appoint the adjudicators for a set 
term, of say seven years, as at other international adjudicative bodies that hear claims by individuals in 
the regulatory sphere, as well as in the case of domestic courts (although the domestic standards are more 
rigorous, in that judicial tenure is typically granted for life or until a set retirement age).98 The concerns 
would be alleviated further if ICSID appointments were for non-renewable terms; if the adjudicators were 
assigned in an objective way to specific cases; and if appointments took place as part of a wider process 
involving discussion of possible candidates among regional groupings of states, with an opportunity for 
capital-exporters and capital-importers alike to influence the decision. Jan Paulsson criticizes this state-
based model of appointments (with particular reference to the WTO Appellate Body) as lacking in 
legitimacy because it involves the appointment of tribunal members ‘through the political processes of an 
international organization’.99 But it is difficult to understand how case-by-case appointments at ICSID (or 
other appointing authorities in the system) can be described differently, except by noting the more serious 
failure at ICSID to provide security of tenure for those who are appointed and the consequently more 
pervasive role of ICSID’s own political processes. 
Even so, ICSID is arguably better positioned to make these decisions than other appointing authorities in 
the system. ICSID is at least accountable to states, most of which are electoral democracies, and its 
process is relatively open in that: (1) ICSID publicizes the existence of ICSID claims by investors and the 
identity of arbitrators appointed; (2) ICSID appoints from a roster of arbitrators set by the state parties to 
the ICSID Convention (although there remains no objective method of assignment to specific cases, and 
the current roster is too large to make such a process feasible); (3) ICSID decisions are usually released to 
the public (at least in part); and (4) ICSID annulment tribunals give reasons for their decisions on 
impartiality challenges to arbitrators. It is doubtful that these characteristics satisfy the standards of 
openness and accountability of domestic or international courts, but they at least allow a degree of 
scrutiny of ICSID decision-making that is absent for other appointing authorities acting pursuant to the 
UNCITRAL (p.647) Rules, the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Rules), and the 
Rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC Rules), in particular. 
More troubling is the powerful role that is played under some investment treaties by private 
organizations, accountable directly to business interests rather than a public body, that do not provide 
even the most basic assurances of openness and accountability. For example, many treaties100 assign 
appointing authority to the ICC. Under the ICC Rules, arbitrators are appointed by the ICC’s International 
‘Court’101 of Arbitration, the members of which are chosen by the ICC world council of business on the 
recommendation of the ICC Executive Board.102 The ICC Rules themselves are under the custody of the 
ICC and are subject to change according to the ICC’s processes (and power relations), beyond the control 
of the state parties to investment treaties. The ICC has described itself on its website as ‘the world 
business organization’, as ‘the voice of world business’, and as an organization that ‘speaks for world 
business whenever governments make decisions that crucially affect corporate strategies and the bottom 
line’.103 This demonstrates the obvious point that the ICC is a business organization whose purpose is to 
further the interests of its membership, much of which consists of foreign investors that have brought or 
that might bring a claim under an investment treaty, that regularly negotiate investment contracts 
containing arbitration clauses, that hire ICC officials (including arbitrators) as advisers, and so on.104 
It is reasonable, then, to suspect that ICC officials, when appointing arbitrators to specific cases or when 
resolving conflict of interest claims against arbitrators, will tend to favour the interests of investors, on 
whose behalf the ICC works and lobbies, over the regulatory priorities of states. Where the president of an 
international tribunal, appointed to decide key questions of public law, is chosen by an arm of the ICC, it 
is indeed difficult to describe this as anything other than an utter failure to ensure judicial independence 
‘from business and corporate interests’ and to insulate the adjudicator from ‘financial and business 
entanglements likely to (p.648) affect, or rather to seem to affect him in the exercise of his judicial 
function’.105 An analogous situation in the US context might involve a takings dispute between a business 
entity and a state government being resolved, not by the Supreme Court, but by an arbitration tribunal, 
the presiding member of which was appointed by the US Chamber of Commerce. To describe this as an 
independent arrangement for the adjudication of public law would be untenable. 
Because of the role played in the system by organizations likely to favour major states or international 
business—combined with the use of adjudication to make final decisions about matters of great 
importance to states and their people—the lack of objective safeguards in investment treaty arbitration 
undermines the claims that the system delivers a fair, rules-based process. According to Alexander 
Hamilton:106 ‘If the power of making [periodical judicial appointments] was committed either to the 
executive or legislature there would be danger of an improper complaisance to the branch which 
possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either.’ Or as Lord 
Denning said, without secure tenure: ‘[t]he judicial power is simply a part of the executive 
machine’.107 Denning was speaking of the domestic separation of powers, but it is reasonable to expect 
that executive officials at international organizations, whether private or state-based, are also subject to 
the power dynamics of their own executive machine. 
B. The Inappropriate Influence of Private Parties 
Security of tenure serves also to insulate adjudicators from powerful private interests. As such, it is a 
means to ensure that no one can claim credibly that a judge decided a dispute or interpreted the law in 
order to further his or her own financial opportunities. The absence of this and other safeguards in 
investment treaty arbitration re-introduces various questions about bias. And here the public law 
structure of the adjudicative mechanism is particularly relevant. Where only one class of parties 
(investors) can bring claims against the other class (states), and not vice versa,108 arbitrators have an 
apparent interest to interpret the law in ways that facilitate or encourage claims (albeit without 
undermining the political foundations for the system's existence). If the arbitrator identifies his or her 
own interests with those of the arbitration industry—a reasonable assumption in many cases—then he or 
she may be motivated (or feel obliged) to resolve disputes and interpret the law in ways that grow the 
arbitration industry, enhance his or her status among gatekeepers within it, and encourage powerful 
states to value the system so as not to jeopardize the industry's role. 
On the difficulty with using arbitration to resolve finally questions of public law, a stark warning is 
provided by Yves Dezaley and Brant Garth's classic empirical (p.649) study of the international 
arbitration industry.109 Although their research did not focus specifically on investment treaty arbitration 
and its unique characteristics, Dezaley and Garth's findings indicate that competitive pressures in the 
arbitration industry pose a threat to independence in public law adjudication, all the more so in a system 
that involves case-by-case appointments and asymmetrical claims. Relevant observations in their study, 
which was based on extensive interviews with participants in the arbitration industry, include the 
following: 
The operation of the market in the selection of arbitrators…provides a key to understanding the justice 
that emerges from the decisions of arbitrators.110 
The new generation of [arbitration] technocrats…emphasizes their ability to satisfy the consumers in 
order to gain repeat business.111 
For the lawyers and their justice, the question is how to affirm the autonomy necessary for legitimacy 
while at the same time manifesting sufficient fidelity to the economic powers who must in the end find 
these services worth purchasing and deploying.112 
It is good arbitration politics to thank business lawyers or other acquaintances who bring nice arbitration 
matters by letting them have limited access to the arbitration market. This system of exchange of favors is 
essential to success in arbitration, a career dependent on personal relations.113 
The growth of the market in arbitration is also evident in the competition that can be seen among 
different national approaches and centers.114 
They [the newcomer arbitrators of the 1980s and 1990s] present themselves…as international arbitration 
professionals, and also as entrepreneurs selling their services to business practitioners…115 
The ICC [International Chamber of Commerce] has…become one of the principal places where the 
‘politics’ of arbitration is elaborated and expressed. There are innumerable committees and multiple 
networks of influence that gravitate around this institution. The [ICC International Court of Arbitration], 
for example, which is really an oversight committee that reviews arbitration appointments and decisions, 
appears to be particularly sensitive to the business clientele…116 
The multinational companies are in this way investing in the construction of these legal services that serve 
them.117 
These findings convey the fact that arbitrators operate in a marketplace in which each supplier of the 
‘symbolic capital’ arising from individual reputations has an interest to further his or her own position 
and that of the industry as a whole.118 The industry consists of networks of cross-connected players. They 
affiliate around prominent centres of arbitration such as the ICC. Prominent arbitrators may name each 
other for appointments and exclude those who are not accepted within the culture. With the passing of the 
old generation of gentleman arbitrators, the new technocrats are more likely to have an orientation that 
differentiates (p.650) and promotes their industry in relation to its competitors (here, domestic courts 
and international diplomacy).119 Because arbitrators can earn income from activities beyond the 
adjudicative role, including from the private practice of investment law, the industry encompasses—
although to varying degrees—not only the arbitrators themselves, but also the lawyers and aspiring 
arbitrators working in or around the system and the assorted experts and commentators who seek work as 
expert witnesses, advisers, or arbitrators.120 Prominent players often sit as arbitrators while advising and 
representing claimants or respondents and while promoting arbitration clauses in investment contracts, 
treaties, or arbitration rules.121 
It must be obvious to anyone working in the industry, as to the informed outsider, that investment 
arbitration will not thrive unless businesses that own assets abroad consider it worthwhile to bring claims, 
and unless powerful states continue to see benefits in the system so as not to pull the plug on it.122 One 
would expect, then, that the ‘economic powers’ demanding appeasement by the industry include 
claimants (investors), especially repeat players or firms that negotiate arbitration clauses in their 
contracts, as well as the major players in appointing authorities. That said, arbitrators can also be 
expected to avoid favouring blatantly the system's consumers or overseers in order to protect their claims 
to autonomy and legitimacy.123 How arbitrators choose to present themselves as ‘entrepreneurs selling 
their services’ is likely to depend on the relevant sub-market for appointments (ie investors, states, one or 
more appointing authorities, or a combination). And, as the degree of connection will vary between 
individual arbitrators and particular arbitration centres or the industry as a whole, so too will the degree 
of apparent financial or career-related pressure.124 Nevertheless, all arbitrators who aspire to future 
business will have reason to promote the system among prospective claimants while defending it from 
rejection by the most powerful states. 
This provides a basis for suspicion about inappropriate bias in the system. It raises precisely the sorts of 
concerns that safeguards of independence seek to dispel by removing adjudicators from the market and by 
positioning them instead as members of a separate institution. As Lederman put it in 1976: ‘The 
conditions on which [judges] hold office mean that they have no personal career interest to be served by 
the way they go in deciding cases that come before them.’125 In (p.651) the absence of the safeguards, the 
career interests return with a vengeance, with major consequence in the adjudication of public law. 
C. Actual versus Perceived Bias 
Some have argued that concerns about apparent bias in investment treaty arbitration are misplaced 
because there is no proof of actual bias in the system. This response misconstrues the standards of 
independence that apply to judges and typically to other adjudicators. It is rarely if ever a requirement in 
adjudication that actual bias be proven in order to disqualify an adjudicator (although proof of actual bias 
will of course suffice to disqualify). Rather, the requirement is for an absence of an unacceptable 
‘apprehension’ of bias, or ‘appearance’ or ‘suspicion’ or ‘danger’ of bias,126 so as to recognize that the 
absence of actual bias, while vital, is not enough. What is also required is a sound basis for an informed 
outsider to conclude that the adjudicator is sufficiently insulated from inappropriate bias. Where to draw 
the line as to what perceptions constitute a sufficient basis for doubt may depend on various factors.127 But 
only in highly extraordinary circumstances—perhaps where an available pool of expert commercial 
adjudicators consisted of only one or a few people in a small sector in which everyone worked very closely 
together—might proof of actual bias be the sole basis for questioning independence. 
The Court of Appeal of England and Wales explained the concern for perceived bias, as well as actual bias, 
in the Locabail decision:128 
…objections and applications based on what, in the case law, is called ‘actual bias’ are very rare, partly (as 
we trust) because the existence of actual bias is very rare, but partly for other reasons also. The proof of 
actual bias is very difficult, because the law does not countenance the questioning of a judge about 
extraneous influences affecting his mind; and the policy of the common law is to protect litigants who can 
discharge the lesser burden of showing a real danger of bias without requiring them to show that such bias 
actually exists. 
This highlights two problems with a reliance on proof of actual bias as the basis for establishing 
independence. First, it is unrealistic to expect a party to be able to establish actual bias given the obvious 
difficulties of doing so. Secondly, it would be unbecoming of the adjudicative process to compel the 
adjudicator to testify as to his or her state of mind, opinions, etc. Thus, in the well-known words of Lord 
Hewart, ‘it is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should not 
only be done, but should manifestly and(p.652) undoubtedly be seen to be done’.129 In this respect, for 
example, the Supreme Court of Canada requires ‘that the court or tribunal be reasonably perceived as 
independent’ and explains that: ‘[t]he reason for this additional requirement was that the guarantee of 
judicial independence has the goal not only of ensuring that justice is done in individual cases, but also of 
ensuring public confidence in the justice system’.130 
Assessing whether a reasonable perception of bias exists requires one to consider indicators of possible 
bias on the part of the individual adjudicator.131 That is, are there any direct or indirect connections 
between the individual adjudicator and other interests that raise a concern? Is there evidence of an 
attitudinal bias arising from what the individual has said or written in the past? Was the individual 
previously involved in the dispute or in relevant decision-making involving a disputing party? These sorts 
of questions are addressed or alluded to in many arbitrator codes of conduct132 and in the submissions 
made when investment treaty arbitrators are challenged by a disputing party. What one does not see in 
investment treaty arbitration, but what one should expect when adjudication is used to decide public law, 
are the safeguards that apply to courts when they are called on to resolve questions of public law. The 
need for these safeguards ‘follows from the fact that independence is status oriented; the objective 
guarantees define that status’.133 Different jurisdictions frame such requirements in different ways, but the 
safeguards themselves are widely recognized in the liberal democratic tradition of judicial review.134 They 
are also widely recognized in statements of international organizations135 and in the founding instruments 
of international courts136 as central components of judicial independence. They do not 
guarantee (p.653)judicial purity of mind and complete freedom from inappropriate influence.137 But they 
are nonetheless widely accepted to be institutional preconditions.138 
D. Empirical Study of Actual Bias 
A series of related arguments have been made to the effect that the experience in investment treaty 
arbitration to date reveals the system to be neutral and independent. For instance, it is sometimes said 
that claimants are frequently unsuccessful and that, even where the claimant is successful, the outcome is 
usually an award of only a proportion of the compensation originally claimed. Not having analysed the 
data systematically, I myself would have guessed that tribunals decline jurisdiction in about 20 per cent of 
cases and find in favour of the claimant in about 50 per cent of the remaining cases, although in a 
significant minority of these cases the amount awarded is not more than a few million dollars. A more 
rigorous study of seventy-nine publicly-available awards found that ICSID tribunals rarely declined to 
hear claims on jurisdictional grounds, that investors who negotiated host-country consents to ICSID 
jurisdiction on their own initiative [ie pursuant to a contract] hurt their claims’ ability to withstand 
objections for lack of jurisdiction, and that investors from the richest countries had the most success in 
securing ICSID jurisdiction.139 In two detailed studies, Susan Franck found that investors were successful 
and received damages in twenty of the fifty-two final awards reviewed140 and that, in forty-two cases 
reviewed, there was no statistically significant association between the OECD status or income-level of the 
state of nationality of a tribunal's presiding arbitrator and certain adjudicative outcomes for OECD/non-
OECD states or for states with varying income levels.141 
Some of the findings in the limited empirical work to date thus appear to support the prospect of some 
sort of bias within the system in favour of claimants and powerful states, while others appear to refute it. 
None offers compelling evidence in either respect, however. This is partly due to the limitations of the 
relevant studies; their necessarily limited samples fall short of what would be required for generalizable 
results, and the parameters of Franck's study did not (p.654) account for in-group heterogeneity of 
OECD countries, in particular.142More fundamentally, it is simply very difficult to answer empirically 
whether claimants or states, or particular players within those categories, would be more or less likely to 
succeed under a court-based model rather than arbitration, and whether major issues would be decided 
differently by judges as opposed to arbitrators. Empirical work, quantitative and qualitative,143 is useful 
and illuminating of expectations about adjudicative tendencies, but, because we are dealing with complex 
decision-making in circumstances where there can be no controlled comparator, efforts to prove or 
disprove actual bias will lead, at best, to tentative findings.144 Indeed, for this very reason, standards of 
adjudicative independence demand the absence of perceived bias as well as actual bias. 
E. Existing Protections within the System 
In a recent article, Charles Brower and Stephan Schill responded in detail to concerns about apparent bias 
in investment treaty arbitration.145 One of their main points146 was that the argument that there is such a 
concern ‘disregards (p.655) that arbitrators are impartial and independent dispute resolvers who 
interpret and apply the governing law and are subject to a number of mechanisms that can prevent private 
interests from taking precedence over public interests’.147 They emphasized that investment treaty 
arbitrators are subject to ‘several formal and informal mechanisms that ensure the impartiality and 
independence of arbitrators’.148 Among these, they refer to the duty of arbitrators to disclose information 
that may reveal impartiality, the ability of a disputing party to challenge an arbitrator's appointment 
before a domestic court, appointing authority, or arbitral institution, and the possibility for public 
scrutiny based on the dissemination of awards in professional communities and online. 
Each of these mechanisms is important to assuage concern about bias. But all apply also in the case of 
independent courts that decide public law. They are, as such, complementary to and not substitutes for 
the other safeguards that courts enjoy. One would not say that an automobile was roadworthy because it 
had an engine, brakes, and chassis, but no wheels or windows. All of a series of components may be 
essential for the operation of the whole. And, as widely recognized, safeguards like security of tenure are 
critical preconditions—though not absolute guarantees—to the assurance of judicial independence. To 
withdraw these components, even while leaving others in place, is to dilute the standard. Brower and 
Schill's counter-argument, in essence, does not justify the removal of objective safeguards in the case of 
investment treaty arbitrators. It is really a claim that arbitrators should be subject to a lower standard 
than the domestic and international courts which carry out similar functions.149 
Of particular importance for Brower and Schill as a means to protect against impartiality are the 
reputations of arbitrators and the point that ‘appointments…are essentially merit-based’ in that ‘the 
crucial factor for appointment is not the possible or real bias of an arbitrator’ but rather ‘his or her 
reputation for impartial and independent judgement’.150 An investment treaty arbitrator's reputation, say 
Brower and Schill, ‘is too fragile to risk by biased decisionmaking and therefore works as a control 
mechanism that ensures the arbitrators’ independence and impartiality’.151 The difficulty with this point is 
that, for anyone (p.656) who must think about how to secure appointments or advance the industry, the 
key reputational concern is one's status among those with power over appointments and over the wider 
success of the industry. In investment treaty arbitration, the actors who wield such power cannot be 
assumed by the outsider to prefer an impartial and independent approach to the resolution of all investor-
state disputes. It is likely, rather, that they will prefer approaches that accord with their own interests. 
Referring to the market for ‘merit-based’ appointments is thus another way of describing how arbitrators 
will strive to appease those who have influence in the appointing authorities and over the industry. It is 
precisely this concern of the untenured adjudicator for his or her reputation in the marketplace that 
undermines the claim to independence.152 
V. Conclusion 
Some proponents of investment treaty arbitration are quick to judge the substantive choices of states but 
reluctant to acknowledge the procedural failings of investment treaty arbitration. Above all, there is a 
tendency to downplay the system's inattention to well-known safeguards of judicial independence. Yet to 
defend investment treaty arbitration as a rule of law-based alternative to domestic courts and to 
international diplomacy is to convey a high expectation of fairness in the system. The process is 
adjudicative; it is used to decide public law; it is highly determinative; it involves the review of legislative 
and judicial decisions as well as broad policy decisions of the executive; it circumvents domestic remedies; 
it leads to state liability involving potentially vast sums; it triggers coercive enforcement in many 
countries; it may lead to severe losses for investors whose claims fail or who face a costs award. Thus, it is 
problematic to make the rule of law argument and then to argue that—despite all this—the system need 
not satisfy the standards of independence that ensure fairness in courts carrying out similar functions. 
To be clear, the argument here is not a criticism of international courts and tribunals that enjoy 
safeguards of independence, such as the International Court of Justice, the European Courts, or the WTO 
Appellate Body. Some would strive to tie the fate of investment treaty tribunals to that of other 
‘international courts and tribunals’ which must ‘defend themselves on a regular basis against attacks on 
their legitimacy as mechanisms for resolving disputes about the scope and limits of state 
sovereignty’.153 But this is really an attempt to divert attention from the decision of states to replace courts 
with arbitrators by highlighting instead (p.657) a wider debate154 about the appropriate relationship 
between states and international adjudication. The argument in the present chapter engages the former 
issue, not the latter, in that it criticizes investment treaty arbitration for its failure to provide adequate 
assurances of judicial independence. 
Advocates for the system face a quandary. They must support adjudication, asserting its superiority over 
institutional alternatives in making regulatory choices. But they must defend a particular form of 
adjudication that eschews the hallmarks of judicial independence. By implication, many rule of law-based 
defences of the system seek to impose a set of policy prescriptions on some but not all states and to ensure 
rigorous protections for some but not all foreign investors. Where one or another state or investor stands 
in the system—in terms of the degree of discipline to which it will be subjected or the level of protection it 
can expect—will depend on one's estimation of the attitudes of the relevant appointing authority and of 
gatekeepers among the arbitrators. Ultimately, the interests of some are likely to be prioritized in ways 
that are unfair to others. Of course, reasonable people may differ on whether the apparent bias—arising 
from the allocation of appointing power within ICSID or the ICC, or from the status of claimants within 
the arbitration industry—seriously erodes the legitimacy of the system as a whole. But, at the very least, 
the inattention paid by many proponents of the system to its institutional failings undermines the 
normative case that they espouse.(p.658) 
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body having the competence to determine, in response to a claim by an individual, the legality of the use 
of sovereign authority, and to award a remedy for unlawful state conduct. Alternatively, it could be said 
that the adjudicative body issues a decision that has important consequences for the state, for the 
individual, and for others affected by what the decision means for the authority and conduct of the 
state…’) Thus, the inquiry should focus not on the formalistic question of whether arbitrators are holders 
of a public office (as Brower and Schill maintain) but rather on the character of the function of the 
arbitrators and the degree to which it resembles judicial review. More importantly, even if one agrees with 
Brower and Schill's answer on this point—by putting investment treaty arbitrators in the category of 
public office holder—the result is to make it more straightforward to argue that the institutional position 
of the arbitrators should be evaluated against the safeguards that apply to public courts. Brower and 
Schill's claim in no way removes the concern that investment treaty arbitrators are vulnerable, like judges 
or other public office holders, to inappropriate influence from within or outside government, if not 
protected by the relevant safeguards. 
(147) Brower and Schill (n 1 above) 489. 
(148) ibid 491. 
(149) For further discussion in response to the point that investment treaty arbitration warrants a lower 
standard of impartiality and independence, see Van Harten (n 146 above) 22–6. 
(150) Brower and Schill (n 1 above) 492. 
(151) ibid 492. 
(152) Important also is the need to signal one's appeal to the gatekeepers in industry who have personal 
and professional connections that lead to recommendations for appointment: Dezaley and Garth 
(n 101 above) 23, 28, 50. 
(153) Brower and Schill (n 1 above) 471. 
(154) eg JK Cogan, ‘Competition and Control in International Adjudication’ (2008) 48 Va JIL 411, 
415; ML Movsesian, ‘International Commercial Arbitration and International Courts’ (2008) 18 Duke 
JCIL 423, 444–8; CA Bradley, ‘The Federal Judicial Power and the International Legal Order’ (2006) 
Supreme Court Review 59; RH Bork, Coercing Virtue: The Worldwide Rule of Judges (2003). 
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights 
Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for 
personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: York University; date: 11 December 2015 
 
